Contracts -- Consideration -- Family Settlement by Benton, Mills Scott
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 8 | Number 4 Article 16
6-1-1930
Contracts -- Consideration -- Family Settlement
Mills Scott Benton
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mills S. Benton, Contracts -- Consideration -- Family Settlement, 8 N.C. L. Rev. 457 (1930).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol8/iss4/16
NOTES AND COMMENTS
tion by a public carrier of passengers is unconstitutional. 13 It is sub-
mitted therefore that the portion of the 1929 statute above set out is
contrary to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
-ment.
14
The statute also provides "that nothing contained in this act or the
law amended hereby shall be construed to declare operators of busses
:and/or taxicabs common carriers." This provision appears to be
superfluous. Whether a carrier is private or public depends upon the
service it renders and not on legislation.1 5 Whether the service ren-
-dered is public or private depends on the facts, and the fourteenth
amendment prevents the legislature from declaring a carrier private
or public unless there is a reasonable basis of fact for so doing.'
A. W. GirOLsoN, JR.
Contracts-Consideration-Family Settlement
The testator, in disposing of his property among his children,
-made special bequests to two of his daughters, in recognition of their
love and attention to himself and their mother. From statements
-made by the eldest son, an executor under the will, the children drew
the inference that the two daughters had, and would enforce, a valid
claim for wages against the estate, unless they were paid. To avoid
litigation an agreement was drawn up, and signed and sealed by the
children, whereby the two daughters were to receive $1,500 each in
addition to the special bequests provided in the will and the unsigned
and undated codicil. The children now seek to have the agreement
set aside on the ground of lack of consideration. Held, that a court
of equity looks with favor upon family settlements, and if asserted in
of the carrier exists by common law." U. S. v. Dodge, Fed. Cas. No. 14,976
(W. D. Texas 1877).
"McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 235 U. S. 151, 35 Sup.
Ct. 69, 59 L. ed. 169 (1914).
'See (1929) 7 N. C. L. Rv. 391-392.
"Waldum v. Lake Superior Terminal & Transfer Ry. Co., 169 Wis. 137,
170 N. W. 729 (1919) ; State v. Public Service Com., 117 Wash. 453, 201 Pac.
765 (1921) ; Pacific Spruce Corp. v. McCoy, 294 Fed. 711 (D. C. Ore. 1923) ;
Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Dist. of Col., 241 U. S. 252, 36 Sup: Ct. 583, 60
L. ed. 984, Ann. Cas. 1916 D 765 (1916).
"Frost v. R. R. Com. of Cal., 271 U. S. 583, 46 Sup. Ct. 605, 70 L. ed. 1101
(1926); Michigan Public Utilities Com. v. Duke, 266 U. S. 570, 45 Sup. Ct.
191, 69 L. ed. 445, 36 A. L. R. 1105 (1925). The state may declare a cor-
poration a common carrier upon the application of the corporation, Corpor-
ation Commission v. Atl. Coast Line R. R. Co., 187 N. C. 424, 121 S. E. 767
(1924).
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good faith, even though in fact unfounded, will sustain them as basef
on valid consideration.'
This case is sustainable regardless of consideration on the ground
that the contract was under seal. 2 Though equity requires a con-
sideration, regardless of any seal, to enforce an agreementa it will not
set a sealed agreement aside because of lack of consideration. The
case might also be sustained as a compromise of a doubtful claim
4
asserted in good faith. 5 But regardless of the seal and compromise,
the court's language was broad enough to indicate that the case would'
have been sustained on the ground of family settlement, even though
the court found no consideration.
By the great 'weight of authority a bona fide agreement by one-
interested in a testator's estate, to refrain from contesting a will is
valid. 6 It is not void as against public policy, since it lessens litiga-
tion.7 The giving up of such contest, begun in good faith or so,
intended, is sufficient consideration for a promise to pay money or
convey property.8
Consideration is in effect the price bargained for and paid for as.
the exchange for the promise.9 The necessity for consideration is the
result of a historical development.10 It is analogous to, but not
identical with the causa requirement under the Civil Law.1' Its.
1Weade v. Weade, 150 S. E. 238 (Va. 1929), commented on in (1930) 16
VA. L. Rav. 406.
'Harris v. McKay, 138 Va. 448, 122 S. E. 137, 32 A. L. R. 156 (1924).
'Lamprety v. Lamprety, 29 Minn. 151, 12 N. W. 514 (1882); Pound, Coll-
sideration in Equity (1919) 13 ILL. L. REv. 667.
'1 WILLISTOrN, CONTRACTS (1924) §135 at 295.
" Cole v. Cole, 292 Ill. 154, 126 N. E. 752, 38 A. L. R. 719 (1920) ; Layer v.
Layer, 184 Mich. 663, 151 N. W. 759 (1915). Mere good faith alone is not
sufficient consideration, Hardin v. Hardin, 201 Ky. 310, 256 S. W. 417, 38
A. L. R. 756 (1923), and the claim compromised must not be frivolous or
unreasonable, Stellers v. Jones, 164 Ky. 458, 175 S. W. 1002 (1915) ; 1 WIL-
LISTON, op. cit. supra note 4, at 296.
'In re Cook's Will, 244 N. Y. 63, 154 N. E. 823 (1926), 55 A. L. R. 806
(1928) ; Collins v. Collins, 151 Wash. 201, 275 Pac. 571 (1929). To the effect
that the contestant must have an interest in the property, see Conklin v.
Conklin, 165 Mich. 571, 131 N. W. 154 (1911).
'In re Cook's Will, supra note 6.
8 Hollowoa v. Buck, 174 Ark. 497, 296 S. W. 74 (1927) ; Blount v. Dilla-
way, 199 Mass. 330, 85 N. E. 477, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1036 (1908); Note
(1925) 38 A. L. R. 734, 740.
8 CONTRACTS RFSTATEmENT (Am. L. Inst. 1928) §75.
102 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY (1906) Ch. 3.
' Causa is, in its proper meaning, the "reason" or "situation" for doing
something; it has. through use, finally reached the point where it is very
intangible and hard to define or qualify, RADIN, RoMAx LAW (1927) 297-300.
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-present purpose seems to be to avoid litigation over trivial promises
not based upon any substantial motive.
The law still requires consideration. In its technical sense, as it
is generally thought of, it is something of value given in exchange;
this was the common law idea. It is, in its widest sense, the reason,
inotive or inducement, by which a person is moved to bind himself by
an agreement.12 But the conception of consideration is gradually
broadening and the courts are now enforcing promises, made with-
out any value given for them, to pay debts which are barred by the
Statute of Limitations 3 or discharged in bankruptcy,1 4 as promises
to perform voidable duties.1 5 This same tendency is evidenced by
various other kinds of cases."' And the Uniform Written Obliga-
tions Act is a further example. Section 1 of the Act provides that a
written promise made and signed shall not be unenforceable for want
of consideration, if it contains a statement to the effect that the signor
intends to be legally bound.1 7 This seems to aim to carry out the
intention of the parties as evidenced by the instrument, even in the
absence of consideration.
The inflection; in the instant case, of the language of previous
cases' s clearly shows the broadening of the requirement of consider-
ation in the law of contracts. This trend seems to lead to the logical
conclusion that future cases will support family settlements despite
want of consideration in the usual sense of legal detriment to the
promisee or benefit to the promisor.
MILLS ScoTT BENTON.
Corporations-Negligence of Directors-Right of
Corporate Creditor to Sue
The Supreme Court of North Carolina recently held that plaintiffs,
corporation creditors, stated a good cause of action in a complaint
which charged the defendants, directors of a now insolvent corpor-
'SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE (7th ed. 1924) 374.
' CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, §86.
" CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, §87.
' CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, §89.
"CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, §§85-94.
'HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS (1925) 584.
It is well settled that courts will go further to sustain family settlements
than they will under ordinary circumstances, Baas v. Zinke, 218 Mich. 502, 188
N. W. 512 (1922); Trigg v. Read,;5 Humph. 528, 42 Am. Dec. 447 (Tenn.
1845); Price v. Winston, 4 Munf. 63 (Va. 1813); 1 PAGE, CONTRACTS (1920)
§623; Note (1925) 38 A. L. R. 734.
